中國礦產資源存儲過剩的代價

Beijing has suffered a decades-long anxiety attack at the thought that the global marketplace would not be able to meet China's demand for natural resources. But now they have exactly the opposite problem: Traders are using abandoned warehouses, parking lots and granaries to store all the surplus iron ore, copper, coal and other metals and minerals they've accidentally bought in preparation for a sustained economic expansion that isn't happening. Oops.

數十年來，中國曾一直認爲全球市場可能沒法滿足中國對自然資源的需求，併爲此憂心忡忡。然而現在他們卻面臨着截然相反的問題：貿易商們正在把過剩的鐵礦石、銅、煤炭以及其它金屬和礦物資源一古腦地存進原本被廢棄的倉庫、停車場和穀倉中。這些人在偶然的狀況下買進這些資源，爲經濟持續擴張做準備，卻發現這種擴張並未到來。唉！

The Chinese have become good at extracting resources when and where Western market economies won't. Just don't mistake that brawn for brains. Today's gluts are not precisely the opposite side of the coin of growing list of uneconomical Chinese mining investments abroad. Rather, they are both facets of the same dodecahedron, as it were: Beijing's near-pathological refusal to trust market prices for anything.

有時候，西方國家並不想在某些時間、從某些地點獲取資源，於是中國人就利用這樣的時機竭力榨取資源，而且做得越來越熟練，不過，可別把這種有勇無謀當成明智之舉。中國在海外不斷增長的礦業投資並不盈利，而且還導致了資源過剩。這種不盈利和資源過剩不能說是一個硬幣的兩面，而更像是一個十二面體的兩個不同側面，反映的都是這樣一個事實：中國政府一意孤行地拒絕相信任何東西的市場價格。

A simple example concerns iron ore. Stocks are about one-third greater than their four-year average, Reuters reported last month, and although stores have come down slightly since then a significant overhang remains. This is a major turn from a few years ago, when Beijing obsessed about high iron ore prices resulting from China's seemingly insatiable appetite.

可以舉一個簡單的有關鐵礦石的例子。據路透社(Reuters)上個月報道，當時鐵礦石的庫存量比過去四年均值高出三分之一。儘管從報道發出之日到現在，庫存量已經稍有下降，但總量依然相當可觀。與前幾年相比，這是一個非常重大的變化。彼時，中國那看起來永遠無法滿足的胃口令鐵礦石的價格居高不下，政府還在爲此煩惱不已。

Remember BHP Billiton chief executive Marius Kloppers reassuring Beijing that the global spot market would provide, even as the old system of cartelized price negotiations fell apart? Had Beijing cared to reflect on that advice at the time, it might have seen an opportunity in high spot prices. For years, planners have aspired to force consolidation on China's steel industry, to little avail. Rising input prices would ordinarily be a force pushing in that direction. Look at what has happened to the U.S. airline industry in the face of high fuel and labor costs.

必和必拓首席執行長高瑞思(Marius Kloppers)曾安撫中國政府說，即便卡特爾式價格談判的舊體系最終破產，全球現貨市場也能提供足夠的資源，還有人記得這番話嗎？如果中國當時能稍微想一想這個建議的話，那麼它當時也許能夠在高企的現貨價格中看到機會。多年來，計劃者們一直渴望在中國的鋼鐵行業內以強力推動整合，然而收效甚微。通常來說，不斷上漲的投入價格會成爲推動行業朝整合方向發展的力量，不信的話，看看美國航空業在面臨高額的燃料和勞動力成本時發生了什麼。

Instead, Beijing deployed loose credit to help steelmakers dampen the effects of ore prices and stay in business. Even now, with producers already on the skids amid a growing glut of finished steel, Beijing intends to invest $20 billion in new mills under its latest stimulus.

相反，政府卻放鬆信貸，幫助鋼鐵生產商降低鐵礦石價格上漲對其造成的影響，以免被淘汰出局。眼下，成品鋼供過於求的狀況日益嚴重，生產商們的情況也每況愈下，然而即便如此，中國政府仍然計劃通過最新一次刺激方案再給鋼鐵生產商投入200億美元。

Meanwhile, Beijing went on a buying spree to snap up overseas mines at a cost of billions of dollars. Those investments, whatever they might have done to secure supply (answer: not much), didn't affect global prices appreciably since they were generally made in existing mines instead of in exploration projects to increase production. And they now mean that Beijing stands to lose as global price declines make those projects less profitable.

同時，中國仍舊在砸下數以十億計的美元無節制地搶購海外的鐵礦。這些投資，無論在保障供給方面有多大用處（答案是寥寥無幾），都不會對鐵礦石的全球價格產生多大影響，因爲這些投資大部分流向對現有的鐵礦石進行開採，而非投向能增加產量的勘探項目。這意味着政府將承受虧損，因爲鐵礦石全球價格的下跌使得這些投資項目的利潤大大減少。

And then there's copper, imports of which have grown some 70% this year as economic growth slows. Recent photos taken by investment-bank analysts show where those imports end up. The copper sits in bonded warehouses, piled to the rafters, blocking doorways and occupying parking lots.

還有銅。儘管今年經濟增速放緩，銅的進口卻增長了約70%。投行分析師近期拍攝的照片顯示，這些進口銅最終被堆在了保稅倉庫中，高及屋椽，不但堵住了門口還佔據了停車位。

This accumulation is far out of proportion to China's "consumption," meaning copper that actually goes into a furnace somewhere and comes out as wire or pipe that's used for something. There's debate about what that level of consumption is, but there is currently a real possibility it is falling as growth slows and Beijing tamps down the overheated property market.

這種程度的“積累”與中國的“消費”完全不成比例。所謂“消費”，意味着銅真的進入了熔爐，被製成銅線或銅管投入使用。儘管消費水平目前到底屬於哪一層次尚存爭議，但目前隨着中國經濟增速放緩，政府又在抑制過熱的房地產市場，銅的消費量很有可能下滑。

But those piles in the warehouses aren't waiting to be made into pipe. They are collateral. At times when Beijing tries to restrain formal yuan credit creation at the banks, cash-starved companies have resorted to importing commodities instead as a means to raise capital.

但倉庫中那些成堆的銅並不是等着被製成銅管的。它們是抵押品。在政府試圖抑制銀行以正規手段進行信用創造時，急需資金的公司就只好將進口商品作爲一種籌資手段。

Here's how it works. The Chinese firm borrows dollars to buy copper, which is then stored in bonded warehouses. After the warehouse issues a letter of credit confirming the copper exists, the company uses the letter as collateral for a yuan-denominated loan for perhaps 85% of the value of the copper. Dollar credit becomes yuan credit, circumventing Beijing's tightening.

他們是這樣操作的。中國公司借美元來買銅，然後將其存在保稅倉庫中。在倉庫出具證明證實這些銅確實存在後，公司便將這個證明當作抵押品，換取人民幣貸款（金額大約相當於銅價的85%）。美元信貸於是變成了人民幣信貸，成功地繞開了政府的收緊措施。

This explains why, contrary to normal usage, copper prices tend to rise when Chinese monetary policy is tight, and fall as it loosens. Sure enough, as Beijing has been lowering required reserve ratios for banks in an easing measure, traders are starting to export surplus "financial" copper again. If you can get normal credit, there's no reason to mess around with a metal.

這就解釋了，爲什麼銅價在中國收緊貨幣政策的情況下會出現上升的傾向，而在貨幣政策放鬆時會出現下降的傾向，這種情形和銅真正投入使用的結果截然相反。當然，在中國政府放鬆政策降低銀行存款準備金率時，貿易商們就開始出口剩餘的作爲金融工具的銅。如果你能通過正常渠道獲得貸款，自然就沒有理由摻和與金屬有關的麻煩事了。

The original sin here is Beijing's steadfast refusal to allow the market to set a price for capital. When credit quotas, administrative guidance and political connections replace a market interest rate and arm's-length risk assessment in allocating money, gamesmanship will abound. Today's copper glut is a result.

原罪就在於中國政府堅決不許市場爲資本定價。在資金分配方面，一旦信用配額、行政指令和政治關係替代了市場利率和公平的風險評估，各種小動作自然層出不窮。眼下，銅供應過剩便是結果之一。

Then a perverse effect occurs when Beijing tries to stimulate the economy by adding liquidity to the bank system. This looser money triggers a lower copper price. This squeezes some of the otherwise profitable small firms who have borrowed via copper and now see the value of their collateral falling-and the risk that their loans will be called rising.

因此當中國政府試圖通過增加銀行系統的流動性來刺激經濟時，一種反常的效應便出現了：寬鬆的貨幣政策促使銅價下跌。這使得一些在正常狀況下（貨幣政策變寬鬆導致銅價上漲）能賺得一些利潤的小公司受到了擠壓，他們通過將銅抵押獲得了貸款，結果卻發現他們的抵押品正在貶值，貸款被收回的風險也在增加。

The recent unused mounds of resources are often presented as a case of Chinese buyers having incorrectly forecast demand for commodities. Yes, but the "why" behind that points to a more serious problem. This isn't the sort of error in business judgment companies make all the time in a market economy. Anyone in a market can misjudge the future. Rather, today's gluts arise from Beijing's chronic disregard for what price signals tell it about the present.

近期這些成堆的閒置資源常常被當作一箇中國買家在預測商品需求方面出錯的案例。這誠然是不錯的，但錯誤背後的“爲什麼”卻指向了一個更復雜的問題。這不是市場經濟中所有公司都時不時會犯的那類商業判斷錯誤。市場中，任何人都有可能誤判未來，但相比之下，目前的礦產資源過剩則是中國政府長期對價格信號所反映出的“當下”視而不見的結果。