中俄關系是盟友而非"友後敵"

Often likened to being “between a rock and a hard place”, Central Asia’s relatively isolated position has required it to maintain consistent and balanced good relations with two giant neighbours, China and Russia.

中亞的處境常被比作“左右爲難”，其相對孤立的地位要求它必須與兩大鄰國——中國和俄羅斯——保持協調、平衡的良好關係。

Nevertheless, its high degree of integration with Russia has jolted the region’s local economies, the result of their twin exposure to the protracted Ukrainian crisis and the slump in commodity prices, manifested through tanking local currencies and reduced inflows of remittances from workers abroad.

然而，由於中亞與俄羅斯高度一體化，受曠日持久的烏克蘭危機和大宗商品價格暴跌的雙重影響，該地區的經濟遭受重創，這一點從當地貨幣糟糕的表現和海外工人匯款流入的減少便可見一斑。

Anxiety has further gripped post-Soviet states in recent months, with the recent 35 per cent slump in the Azerbaijan manat and a 34 per cent devaluation in Turkmenistan, often considered the economy with the least direct exposure to Russia. Concerns are spreading in Kazakhstan of an additional devaluation of the tenge (following last year’s 20 per cent decline) amid calls for early presidential elections.

這些前蘇聯共和國近幾個月來愈發焦慮，阿塞拜疆貨幣馬納特匯率近期下滑35%，土庫曼斯坦貨幣貶值34%，通常認爲這兩個國家的經濟受俄羅斯的直接影響最小。哈薩克斯坦貨幣堅戈繼去年匯率下跌20%後進一步貶值，擔憂情緒正在其國內蔓延，民衆要求提前舉行總統大選。

Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan arguably face even greater pressure, with both GDP and fiscal revenue highly dependent on remittances from Russia and the transit of Chinese manufactured goods into Russia/Uzbekistan. Neither has a promising outlook; the World Bank currently forecasts remittances to decline 4.9 per cent and 17.8 per cent in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan respectively this year, while Kyrgyz export volumes to Russia slumped 33 per cent year on year last year – also partly the result of a concerted crackdown on Kyrgystan’s re-export industries.

吉爾吉斯斯坦和塔吉克斯坦無疑面臨更大的壓力，這兩國的國內生產總值(GDP)和財政收入高度依賴來自俄羅斯的匯款，以及中國商品進入俄羅斯或烏茲別克斯坦的過境運輸費。兩國的前景都不樂觀，據世界銀行(World Bank)目前預測，今年吉爾吉斯斯坦的匯款將下降4.9%，塔吉克斯坦將下降17.8%。吉爾吉斯斯坦對俄羅斯的出口量去年同比下跌33%，部分原因是吉爾吉斯斯坦再出口業受到聯合性打擊。

Uzbekistan, the region’s most densely populated country, has also seen an 11 per cent decline in its som currency over the last year, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) expects inflation to remain in double digit figures as a result.

中亞人口最稠密的烏茲別克斯坦，其貨幣索姆的匯率在過去一年也出現了11%的下跌。據國際貨幣基金組織(IMF)預計，烏茲別克斯坦的通脹率也將因此保持在兩位數。

Diversifying remains a challenge

多元化仍然是個挑戰

The twin factors of low oil prices and Russian weakness have further pushed Central Asian states to diversify their economies. Nevertheless, their ability to integrate into global manufacturing supply chains remains hampered by their relative geographical isolation, problematic infrastructure and mostly low population densities.

油價低迷和俄羅斯經濟走弱這兩個因素進一步推動中亞國家實行經濟多樣化。但它們融入全球製造業供應鏈的能力，仍受阻於它們相對偏僻的地理位置、成問題的基礎設施和普遍的低人口密度。

As an example, Japanese companies have not expanded manufacturing facilities into Central Asia as they have rapidly done in Southeast Asia, due to this lack of competitiveness. Accumulated financial exposure to Central Asia and the Caucasus by the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), Japan’s main policy lender, currently amounts to only ¥642bn, barely 3 per cent of its total ¥21,106bn exposure across Asia, and most of this has also gone towards energy-related services.

舉例來說，日本企業在東南亞迅速擴大了生產設施，但在中亞就沒這麼做，原因是這裏缺乏競爭力。日本的主要政策性銀行——日本國際協力銀行(JBIC)對中亞和高加索地區的金融敞口累積到現在，才僅僅6420億日元，勉強爲其對全亞洲211060億日元總敞口的3%。而且JBIC在該地區的大部分敞口都投入了能源相關服務。

Moreover, the declining rouble itself further stymies the potential for local manufacturing, given Russia’s much larger industrial economies of scale. Car dealers in Kazakhstan, for example, have slashed retail prices by an average 30 per cent in recent months to compete with a surge in Russian imports.

此外，由於俄羅斯工業的規模經濟比中亞大得多，盧布匯率下跌進一步阻礙了當地製造業的發展可能。比如哈薩克斯坦汽車經銷商近幾個月將零售價平均削減了30%，以與激增的俄羅斯進口汽車競爭。

Separately, private sector development and local innovation are difficult to implement even in the region’s more advanced economies, due both to the dominance of the state sector in most countries and the lack of access to credit and capital markets.

再有，即便是中亞發展水平較高的經濟體，也難以實現私營部門的發展和地方創新。原因有兩個，一是國有部門在中亞大多數國家占主導地位；二是缺乏進入信貸和資本市場的渠道。

China’s role in widening the economic base

中國在擴大中亞經濟基礎中的作用

Diversification is thus largely dependent on an expected massive surge in Chinese investment into the region which, in theory, should help build local industrial capacity and manufacturing supply chains. On paper at least, China has committed to investing $16.3bn into multiple infrastructure projects across Central Asia.

於是中亞經濟的多元化很大程度上依賴於一個預期——中國對該地區投資的大量激增。這些投資在理論上應有助於提高當地工業產能，幫助當地建立製造業供應鏈。至少在紙面上，中國已承諾向整個中亞的多個基礎設施項目投資163億美元。

Central Asian states, particularly Kazakhstan, have also embraced the idea of acting as “transit hubs” for manufactured goods between China and Europe. Kazakhstan’s vice president is known to favour Chinese investment and the Astana headquarters of Kazakhstan Temir Zholy, the state-owned railway firm, beams televised pictures of the China-Kazakhstan partnership in the sector onto the streets.

中亞國家，特別是哈薩克斯坦，也接受了充當中歐之間商品“轉運樞紐”的理念。衆所周知，哈薩克斯坦副總理歡迎中國投資，該國國有鐵路公司Kazakhstan Temir Zholy位於阿斯塔納的總部還將中哈在該領域結成合作夥伴關係的電視畫面播放到街頭。

In addition to collecting transit fees on transported goods, this is also expected to result in some manufacturing spillover. A recent Kazakhstan-China investment forum resulted in agreements to establish 20 JV manufacturing projects in sectors such as construction, transport, logistics, and food production.

作爲轉運樞紐，中亞除了可以對轉運商品收取過境費，或許還有望享受到中國製造業的溢出。在最近舉行的哈中投資論壇的促成下，兩國在建築、交通、物流和糧食生產等領域達成了20個合資製造業項目的協議。

Less-developed economies such as Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which also face greater domestic political uncertainty, are seeking Chinese investment into infrastructure. One major flagship project is a mooted Kyrgyz-China rail project, although this faces both political risks in Kyrgzstan’s democratic environment, as well a clampdown on Kyrgzstan’s re-export trade. The deputy finance minister of Tajikistan, meanwhile, announced that China plans to invest $6bn into the Tajik economy over the next three years.

吉爾吉斯斯坦和塔吉克斯坦等欠發達經濟體還面臨着更大的國內政治不穩定，這些國家正在尋求中國對基礎設施的投資。一個主要的旗艦項目是醞釀中吉爾吉斯斯坦-中國鐵路項目，儘管該項目除了面臨吉爾吉斯斯坦國內民主環境的政治風險，還要面對該國再出口貿易受到打擊的風險。與此同時，塔吉克斯坦財政部副部長宣佈，中國計劃在未來三年向該國投資60億美元。

Turkmenistan also aims to become a regional transit hub in which China has a special investment interest. Kazakhstan in late 2014 inaugurated the first direct railway link connecting Iran with western Kazakhstan via Turkmenistan, to more fully diversify from Russian transit routes to Europe. Positioned as a halfway point, this new route also enables Turkmenistan to act as a gate for traded goods simultaneously between Russia, other post-Soviet states, and southwest Asia.

土庫曼斯坦也打算成爲該地區的交通樞紐，而中國對此擁有特殊的投資興趣。2014年底，哈薩克斯坦正式開通了首條經由土庫曼斯坦直接連接伊朗與該國西部的鐵路，使得交通線路在從俄羅斯到歐洲的線路的基礎上，更加多樣化。這條新鐵路使地處線路中端的土庫曼斯坦同時成爲俄羅斯以及其他前蘇聯國家與亞洲西南部國家之間商品貿易的大門。

According to Shohrat Kadyrov, a researcher at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Science, Ashgabat is not only a major provider of gas, but also acts as an interlocutor between China and neighbouring states in the negotiation of supranational infrastructure corridors that aim to facilitate economic integration. In this regard, Turkmenistan is using the prospect of retaining its gas market share in China by investing in additional pipelines, which in turns allows it to bargain for infrastructure investments to facilitate the transit of Chinese-produced goods, arguably at Russia and Kazakhstan’s expense.

俄羅斯科學院東方研究所(Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Science)研究員肖赫拉特•卡德羅夫(Shohrat Kadyrov)認爲，土庫曼斯坦不僅是天然氣的主要供應國，而且還在中國與鄰國間關於建設旨在促進經濟一體化的跨國基礎設施走廊的談判中，扮演中間對話者的角色。在這方面，土庫曼斯坦利用保持其未來在中國天然氣市場份額的前景，投資額外的管道建設，並藉此爭取基礎設施投資以便於中國產商品的運輸，但這無疑將犧牲俄羅斯和哈薩克斯坦的利益。

The importance of Russia

俄羅斯的重要性

Media attention has mostly focused on the surge in aspirant Chinese investment in the region coming “at the expense of Russia”, with the economic downturn luring Central Asian governments towards China’s trade and investment prowess.

媒體關注主要都集中在中國雄心勃勃的投資在本地區的激增（所謂“挖俄羅斯的牆角”），該地區的經濟低迷使得中國的貿易和投資能力對中亞各國政府頗具吸引力。

Nevertheless, it is also clear that Russia remains a crucial partner and ally not just for Central Asian states themselves, but for ensuring the stability of China’s investments in the region, in particular its energy supplies.

然而，同樣清楚的是，不僅對中亞各國自身，而且在確保中國對該地區（特別是能源供應領域）投資的穩定性方面，俄羅斯仍是一個至關重要的合作伙伴和盟友。

Indeed, despite the recent pain caused by Central Asia’s economic alliance with Russia, countries such as Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan appear to be making what amounts to a political decision to join the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), which currently includes Kazakhstan, Belarus and, most recently, Armenia. This comes despite the clear evidence in Kazakhstan’s case that its participation in the EEU has not yielded significant economic benefits, as well as the concomitant exposure to Russian domestic political cycles.

事實上，儘管中亞與俄羅斯的經濟聯盟導致了近期的陣痛，但吉爾吉斯斯坦和塔吉克斯坦等國似乎做出了堪稱政治決策的決定——加入俄羅斯領導的歐亞經濟聯盟(Eurasian Economic Union)。該聯盟目前包括哈薩克斯坦、白俄羅斯以及最近加入的亞美尼亞。儘管有明確的證據表明，哈薩克斯坦的加入並未產生顯著的經濟效益，而且還會暴露在俄羅斯國內政治週期影響之下，這些國家還是決定加入該聯盟。

Russia-led structures such as the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), beyond bland gestures of Sino-Russian geopolitical alliance and common interest, are acquiring real significance through the emphasis on maintaining, expanding, and modernising Russia’s network of military bases in countries such as Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Armenia. Russian bases remain strategic for the security of Central Asian governments themselves, since nearly their entire domestic military budgets go to Russia.

俄羅斯領導的組織——如集體安全條約組織(CSTO)——超越了中俄地緣政治同盟和共同利益的單調錶態，正在通過強調俄羅斯在吉爾吉斯斯坦、塔吉克斯坦和亞美尼亞的軍事基地網絡的維護、擴大和現代化，而獲得真正的影響力。俄羅斯的軍事基地對於中亞各國政府自身的安全仍具有戰略意義，因爲這些國家幾乎所有的軍事預算都流向了俄羅斯。

In this respect, Sino-Russian co-operation is maintained out of a common interest to keep the Central Asian region stable. Chinese investment is required to buffer stagnant inward foreign direct investment flows into Central Asia from Russia.

從這個角度看，中俄合作出於維護中亞地區穩定的共同利益得到維繫。中亞地區需要中國的投資以緩衝來自俄羅斯的外國直接投資的停滯。

However, Beijing needs Russia to provide security in a politically complex region subject to periodic unrest, as a means to ensure its massive investments into the region’s energy and infrastructure sectors. This is particularly crucial given the security imperatives in China’s own restive Xinjiang province, through which all energy supplies pass.

然而，北京方面需要俄羅斯在這個政治形勢複雜、受週期性動盪影響的地區提供安全保障，並以此確保中國大規模投資進入該地區的能源和基礎設施領域。這種保障尤其關鍵，特別是考慮到中國在自身桀驁的新疆維吾爾自治區保障安全的必要——所有能源供應都要經過這一地區。

This pattern of Sino-Russian cooperation is arguably being replicated elsewhere, such as in the ambitious pending construction of the Nicaragua canal, whereby China will finance the majority and Russia will provide military and other forms of security during the construction process.

中俄合作的這種模式無疑正在被複制到其他地方。例如，在雄心勃勃、等待開工的尼加拉瓜運河項目中，中國負責大部分投資，而俄羅斯將在建設過程中提供軍事及其他形式的安全保障。

While media reports often emphasise the “historical distrust” between China and Russia, evidenced by long-drawn and sometimes acrimonious negotiations over bilateral gas supply contracts, it is clear that China does not aspire to undermine Russia’s sociopolitical and security influence in the region, while Russia in turn is not resisting China’s economic encroachment into the region. It might be a stretch to call the relationship symbiotic, but it is certainly mutually tolerant.

雖然媒體報道經常強調中俄之間“歷史上的不信任”，並以兩國間曠日持久、時而爭吵激烈的天然氣供應合同談判爲據，但很明顯，中國並不想削弱俄羅斯在中亞社會政治和安全方面的影響力，而俄羅斯反過來也並不抵制中國對該地區的經濟滲透。稱這種關係爲共生關係可能有些牽強，但它們一定相互寬容。

Diana Gapak is a Russia/CIS analyst. Daniyar Kosnazarov is a head of Central Asia and Caspian Region department, Geopolitics and Regional Studies Division, The Library of the First President of Kazakhstan. Gavin Bowring is a researcher at Asean Confidential, a research service at the Financial Times.

本文作者戴安娜•加帕克(Diana Gapak)是一位專注於俄羅斯/獨聯體的分析師。達尼亞爾•科斯納扎羅夫(Daniyar Kosnazarov)是哈薩克斯坦第一總統圖書館(The Library of the First President of Kazakhstan)地緣政治和地區研究部(Geopolitics and Regional Studies Division)中亞和裏海地區部門負責人。加文•鮑令(Gavin Bowring)是英國《金融時報》旗下研究服務機構《東盟投資參考》(Asean Confidential)研究員。