中國重建信心的機會 A chance for China to restore its credibility

Clear skies greeted the delegates arriving in Beijing for the last annual gathering of China’s parliament. At this year’s meeting of the National People’s Congress, the sMog is thick and the economic gloom thicker. Market sentiment remains fragile, the latest data show a deepening slowdown in both industry and services, and capital flight is keeping the renminbi under pressure. A warning from Moody’s this week added to the downbeat mood: the US rating agency voiced a widespread fear that Chinese officials — previously able to engineer even the weather — may be unable to manage these strains.

一年一度的全國人大會議去年召開之時，迎接抵達北京的代表們的是晴朗的藍天。然而在今年的人大會議召開之際，濃重的霧霾籠罩了北京，經濟的陰霾更是如此。市場情緒依然脆弱，最新數據表明工業和服務業的放緩正在加深，資本外逃使人民幣持續蒙受壓力。穆迪(Moody’s)本週發出的警告加深了悲觀情緒：這家美國評級機構說出了一種廣泛的擔憂情緒——此前甚至連天氣都能控制的中國官員可能無力應對這些壓力。

Moody’s change of stance has little practical effect. China’s fiscal buffers and reserves remain vast. However, it underlines the depth of concern at the growing burden of debt in its economy and highlights the stark choice it faces on its currency regime. Even more striking is the loss of faith in officials’ ability to juggle the competing aims of short-term stimulus, long-term reform and financial stability. Credibility appears to be draining away as rapidly as China’s foreign exchange reserves.

穆迪改變立場並沒有多大的實際影響。中國依然擁有規模巨大的財政緩衝和儲備。然而，此舉強調了對中國經濟中日益加重的債務負擔的深度擔憂，突顯出中國在匯率制度方面面臨的嚴酷選擇。更引人注目的是人們正在喪失對中國官員的信心，懷疑他們是否有能力平衡短期刺激、長期改革和金融穩定這些相互衝突的目標。中國官員的可信度似乎和中國的外匯儲備一樣正在迅速流失。

Chinese officials have already acknowledged the need to communicate their policies better. However, it will take more than words to address these concerns. If capital outflows continue at their current pace, Beijing may be forced to choose within months between tighter capital controls — reversing previous reforms — and allowing a devaluation of the renminbi.

中國官員已經承認有必要更好地溝通他們的政策。然而，要解決這些令人擔憂的問題，僅靠言語是不夠的。如果資本外流以目前的速度繼續下去，或許會迫使北京方面在數月之內作出選擇：是收緊資本管制、扭轉此前的改革，還是允許人民幣貶值。

Capital controls, probably the lesser evil, can buy the government time, but Beijing needs to articulate a clear economic policy if it is to restore confidence and persuade wealthy Chinese to keep their money at home.

資本管制很可能是一種兩害取其輕的選擇，可以爲政府爭取到時間，但如果北京方面想要重建信心，並說服富有的中國人把資金留在國內，就需要闡述清晰的經濟政策。

The NPC is a setting for the government to outline its priorities for reform. One important signal would be to set the growth target for gross domestic product at the lower end of expectations, leaving scope to embark on painful reforms that pay off only over time.

全國人大會議是政府概述其改革優先事項的場合。一個重要的信號將是設定處於預期區間低端的國內生產總值(GDP)增長目標，爲着手只能隨時間推移產生效果的痛苦改革留出空間。

A clear commitment to curb credit growth would alleviate the biggest worry. It is primarily a matter of self-restraint, since the biggest build-up of debt has occurred in state-owned enterprises, local governments and the banks that lend in support of government initiatives.

遏制信貸增長的明確承諾將緩解最大的擔憂。基本上這是一個自我約束問題，因爲債務累積最嚴重的是國有企業、地方政府和放貸支持政府項目的銀行。

Fiscal expansion is probable, but the form this takes is crucial if it is to aid a rebalancing towards services and consumption. The temptation may be to spend on traditional industrial and infrastructure projects; but the need is to focus tax breaks and spending on the services sector and on social security.

財政擴張是十分可能的，但如果財政擴張要幫助中國朝着服務業和消費進行再平衡，其所採取的形式就很關鍵了。在傳統工業和基礎設施項目上支出可能頗具誘惑力；但真正的需求是將減稅和支出集中於服務業和社會保障方面。

Premier Li Keqiang has also promised a ruthless overhaul of bloated, lossmaking state-owned industrial groups — the “zombie companies” that suck up resources. It is not clear how far he will feel able to go, given the social risks of mass lay-offs; but specific, time-limited commitments would be a signal of intent.

總理李克強還承諾要堅定不移地徹底整改臃腫虧損的國有工業集團——吸走資源的“殭屍企業”。目前還不清楚，考慮到大規模下崗的社會風險，他認爲能夠推行到什麼地步；但設定時間限制的具體承諾將能夠反映出意圖。

The overarching issue is that the reforms that are most pressing if China is to move to a new model for growth will inevitably be painful — even more so now that the economy is slowing. From the downsizing of state-owned enterprises to the reform of the hukou system that hobbles migrant workers, they also require the Chinese Communist party to relax its grip on society and cede a bigger role to the private sector. There is little sign that the government is willing to contemplate this. Its instinct is to reassert control — with its muffling of the outspoken tycoon Ren Zhiqiang the latest sign of clampdown. The party should not allow its reflex for control to stand in the way of the changes needed to move China to a more sustainable growth model.

如果中國要轉而採用一種新的增長模式，最重要的問題是，最迫切的改革將不可避免地帶來痛苦——在眼下經濟正在放緩的情況下更加如此。從縮減國有企業規模到改革妨礙外來務工人員的戶籍制度，這些措施也要求中國共產黨放鬆對社會的把持，讓私營企業承擔更大的功能。目前沒有什麼跡象表明政府願意考慮這一點。政府的本能是重申控制權——讓直言不諱的大亨任志強噤聲就是其進行壓制的最新跡象。中國共產黨不應該讓尋求控制的本能阻礙能讓中國轉向更可持續增長模式所需的改變。